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SOMETHING ELSE:  SPECIFIC RELIEF FOR 
BREACH OF HUMAN RIGHTS TERMS IN 
SUPPLY CHAIN AGREEMENTS 
JONATHAN C. LIPSON* 
Contracts may include clauses designed to address human rights related conduct, 
such as the treatment of a party’s employees, which are difficult to enforce.  Model 
Contract Clauses recently promulgated by the ABA Business Law Section Working 
Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in International Supply Contracts seek 
to address these challenges through innovative specific performance terms.  This 
Article assesses these clauses and observes that, while they are unlikely to be enforceable 
in any ordinary sense, they nevertheless have value because they can induce more 
constructive settlements ex post and more thoughtful bargaining, ex ante. 
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“The jurisdiction of a court of equity, in decreeing a specific performance 
of an agreement, is a peculiar jurisdiction, in the exercise of which that 
forum becomes, of its own inherent strength, a court of conscience.”1 
“The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that 
you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else.”2 
INTRODUCTION 
Supply chain agreements (SCAs) are central to global trade; they are 
connective tissue in complex webs of relationships that have produced 
profound economic growth.  While SCAs present many interesting and 
important legal issues, I wish to focus on a new and potentially 
significant aspect of their use:  implementing human rights reforms.  
In particular, I will consider model contract terms (“Model Contract 
Clauses,” or “MCCs”) to protect the human rights of those employed 
by firms that are parties to SCAs, developed by the ABA Business Law 
Section Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in 
International Supply Contracts (the “Working Group”).3 
From an academic perspective, the MCCs reflect a turning point in 
the use of contract.  We typically think of contract as a mechanism to 
promote joint economic gains through shared promissory commitments.  
As Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott put it, “[t]he typical contract is dyadic:  
it has two parties.”4  Its law “should facilitate the efforts of contracting 
parties to maximize the joint gains (the ‘contractual surplus’) from 
transactions . . . [and] nothing else.”5  Using contract to address problems 
                                               
 1. Hudson v. King, 49 Tenn. (2 Heisk.) 560, 568 (1870). 
 2. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). 
 3. See generally David V. Snyder & Susan A. Maslow, Human Rights Protections in 
International Supply Chains—Protecting Workers and Managing Company Risk, 73 BUS. LAW. 
1093, 1096 (2018) [hereinafter Model Contract Clauses]. 
 4. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Third-Party Beneficiaries and Contractual 
Networks, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 325, 325 (2015). 
 5. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 
113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003) (emphasis added). 
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of human rights abuses created by economic globalization is a deliberate 
effort to have contracts do “something else.” 
Whether, and to what extent, mechanisms like the MCCs are able to do 
“something else”—e.g., to achieve their human-rights goals—depends in 
part on the efficacy of the remedies available.  But traditional contract 
remedies—money damages or specific relief—fit poorly in this context. 
Take a simple example.  Assume that U.S. buyer “B” is in a supply 
chain agreement with supplier/seller “S” in a foreign nation.  The SCA 
makes the enforceable choice of the law of the U.S. state of B’s main 
operations.  Assume further that the SCA incorporates a human rights 
(“HR”) term6 under which S agrees not to use “child, slave, prisoner or 
any other form of forced or involuntary labor.”7  B learns from a story 
in the Wall Street Journal that despite supplying conforming goods at 
the agreed price, S has allegedly breached this HR term by using forced 
prison labor.  B’s stock price plummets. 
How, if it got to that, should a court craft a remedy?  Presumptively, 
we start with expectation damages—the difference in value between 
what S promised and what B got.  Because the goods themselves 
conformed to the specifications of the contract, the only material 
defect involved the manner of their production.  From a purely 
commercial perspective, and with respect to those goods, it might be 
hard to show expectation damages. 
We might think that the breach caused consequential damage to B’s 
reputation.  But quantifying reputational harm flowing from breach of 
contract is difficult for courts.8  If B’s shares were publicly traded, we might 
think that a drop in price on the news is a plausible proxy for reputational 
damage.  But many factors contribute to the rise and fall of share prices 
and, in any case, B is not likely to own most of the shares in question.  Its 
                                               
 6. Like the Working Group, I focus mostly on labor-related human rights (HR) 
terms.  I note, however, that the MCCs could apply to substantive terms for a range of 
social, economic, and environmental problems. 
 7. This language derives from a term developed by General Motors.  See Anti-
Slavery and Human Trafficking Statement, GEN. MOTORS CO., https://www.gm.com/ 
content/dam/company/archive/docs/legal/General_Motors_Company_Anti_Slaver
y_And_Human_Trafficking_Statement.pdf (last visited June 1, 2019) (emphasis omitted) 
(“Seller further represents that neither it nor any of its subcontractors, vendors, agents or 
other associated third parties will utilize child, slave, prisoner or any other form of forced 
or involuntary labor, or engage in abusive employment or corrupt business practices, in the 
supply of goods or provision of services under this Contract.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 8. See Redgrave v. Bos. Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 892 (1st Cir. 1988) (en 
banc) (stating that calculating reputational damages may be speculative and unascertainable). 
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shareholders will, but they are not parties to the SCA, even though they 
may be the ones ultimately harmed by B’s now-tainted reputation. 
These and similar problems may have led the drafters of the MCCs to 
consider specific performance and injunctive relief (collectively 
“specific relief”) to be attractive alternatives (or supplements) to money 
damages.9  Thus, the MCCs provide that remedies for breach of HR terms 
may include:  (1) an injunction enforcing the HR term; (2) B’s right to 
require S to remove problematic employees or “Representatives” of S; and 
(3) B’s right to require S to terminate contracts with sub-suppliers.10 
But specific relief is also problematic, especially under U.S. law, which 
tends to view it as “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”11  
Courts seem no more inclined to grant it for claims of reputational harm 
than to award money damages.12  While a court can back up such an 
order with contempt powers,13 it is unclear how effective those powers 
are, especially against defendants who may be in foreign nations.  In any 
case, if a U.S. court orders S to take action specifically contemplated by 
the contract—e.g., to fire an employee or change its employment 
practices—how will it know whether S has complied?  If the harm to B is 
reputational, isn’t B’s better solution to end the contract now and buy 
from someone else, meaning partial rescission?  Uncertainty about these 
remedial paths may lead multinational corporations (MNCs) to wonder 
why they should bother with the MCCs on specific relief at all. 
 This Article tries to address these questions by assessing the efficacy of 
the Model Contract Clauses’ specific relief terms in two steps.  First, I 
note that the MCCs are unlikely to be enforceable in any ordinary sense 
                                               
 9. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 3, ¶ 5.3. 
 10. Id. §§ 1.1, 5.3, at 1097, 1102–03.  See infra Part I.B (defining “Representatives”). 
 11. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (referring to 
preliminary injunctions).  Courts make similar statements about specific performance.  
See Paloukos v. Intermountain Chevrolet Co., 588 P.2d 939, 944 (Idaho 1978) (stating 
that specific performance is a remedy only used when other remedies are not adequate). 
I focus only on U.S. law.  I note that civil law systems may be more receptive to specific 
relief than common law systems.  Henrik Lando & Caspar Rose, On the Enforcement of Specific 
Performance in Civil Law Countries, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 473, 474 nn.6–7 (2004).  They 
do, however, add a layer of complexity beyond the scope of this Article. 
 12. Bennington Foods LLC v. St. Croix Renaissance, Grp., 528 F.3d 176, 178–79 
(3d Cir. 2008) (“[A] plaintiff in a breach of contract case cannot convert monetary 
harm into irreparable harm simply by claiming that the breach of contract has 
prevented it from performing contracts with others and that this subsequent failure to 
perform will harm the plaintiff’s reputation.”). 
 13. Gene R. Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
382, 389 (1983) (discussing the “specter of civil and criminal contempt” for disobeying 
a federal injunction). 
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because they may induce two anxieties that have long troubled judges 
asked to impose specific relief:  the anxiety of indenture and the anxiety 
of entanglement.  The former, indenture, is most problematic when 
courts are asked to order a person to do (or to refrain from doing) 
something, as and to the extent the “something” starts to look like 
involuntary servitude.14  The latter, entanglement, reflects judicial 
concerns about interfering with matters that are personal to the parties or 
that are political, such as value choice or the “public interest.”15 These 
anxieties of indenture and entanglement will constrain and channel the 
judicial imagination in crafting specific relief for the breach of HR terms.  
These limitations might lead parties to eschew HR terms in SCAs.  My 
second point is that they should not.  Rather, parties and courts should 
see that granting specific relief for breach of HR terms shares important 
aspirations with the injunctive relief courts grant in institutional reform 
litigation, lawsuits in which beneficiaries of public programs or agencies 
have sued to reform and restructure those agencies.16  Although not a 
perfect analogy, courts in those cases have developed experimental 
techniques such as monitoring and the use of neutral experts as forms of 
specific relief that could be adapted to cases involving breach of HR terms.  
Thus, parties seeking to use HR terms in supply chain agreements (and 
perhaps future iterations of the Model Contract Clauses) might include 
some of those techniques, including the appointment of monitors, 
trainers, and other quality assurance mechanisms. 
At the same time, specific relief terms often improve performance 
under relational contracts such as SCAs,17 and this should be true of HR 
terms within them.  Negotiating such terms may impose transaction costs, 
but the terms should have the transaction benefits of compelling parties 
to think more deliberately about whether they can make human rights 
related promises, and, if they do so, how they can be performed.  In the 
event of breach, the threat of specific relief tends to have a clarifying effect 
                                               
 14. See infra Section II.B.  
 15. Political entanglement may be especially worrisome.  See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword:  
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 54 (1979) (“[T]he issue is not shrewdness, not the 
capacity of judges to devise strategies for dealing with these limiting forces, but rather the 
very need to devise these strategies and what the perception of this need does to their sense 
of independence. Judges realize that practical success vitally depends on the preferences, 
the will, of the body politic.”).  I discuss the anxiety of entanglement as it pertains to claims 
of religious liberty in Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance:  Religious Liberty and Third-Party Harms, 
84 MINN. L. REV. 589, 593 (2000).   
 16. See infra Section III.A. 
 17. See infra Section III.B. 
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that promotes more efficient negotiated resolution, especially among 
parties who wish to preserve their commercial relationship.18 
The bottom line, then, is that the Model Contract Clauses’ specific 
relief provisions are innovative ways to solve difficult social problems 
created or exacerbated by globalization.  While they may be 
problematic to enforce as currently written, they can have important, 
practical value that parties who are serious about addressing human 
rights problems should consider. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I provides brief 
background on the Model Contract Clauses, and why globalization has 
created demand for them.  Part II addresses some doctrinal challenges 
that the MCCs may present under U.S. law, and how those doctrinal 
challenges mask anxieties of indenture and entanglement.  Part III 
acknowledges these challenges but suggests that such terms 
nevertheless have value as mechanisms to structure consent decrees in 
the event of litigation and, in any case, may productively channel the 
parties’ relationship regarding human rights and similar issues. 
I.    BACKGROUND—GOVERNANCE GAPS IN GLOBAL TRADE  
& THE MODEL CONTRACT CLAUSES 
The benefits of globalization are well understood—chiefly in the 
form of increased wealth for more people.  But, globalization has costs 
as well, articulated as problems of social, economic, and environmental 
responsibility (“SEER”).  These costs are often attributed to “governance 
gaps,” in John Ruggie’s words: 
The root cause of the business and human rights predicament today 
lies in the governance gaps created by globalization—between the 
scope and impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity of 
societies to manage their adverse consequences.  These governance 
gaps provide the permissive environment for wrongful acts by 
companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation.  
How to narrow and ultimately bridge the gaps in relation to human 
rights is our fundamental challenge.19 
SEER problems have often been viewed as problems that government 
must solve.  But of course, there is no global government, and 
conventional, self-seeking strategies may create long-term externalities.  
                                               
 18. See infra Section III.B. 
 19. John Ruggie, Special Rep. of the Sec’y Gen., Promotion and Protection of All 
Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to 
Development ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008). 
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A great deal of global economic activity is undertaken by MNCs, and 
such corporations may for many purposes be “stateless.”20  Among other 
things, this means that they will have an enhanced capacity to evade or 
arbitrage regulation intended to solve SEER problems.  Unless MNCs 
choose to cooperate, it will be difficult to achieve many SEER goals. 
Some MNCs have chosen to cooperate in addressing at least some 
SEER problems through statements of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR).21  Corporate law scholars have invested considerable energy 
debating the merits of CSR.  Optimists such as Merrick Dodd,22 David 
Million,23 and Lyman Johnson,24 have argued that corporations can 
and should act for the benefit of all who are affected by the 
corporation’s activities, not merely their shareholders.  Corporations 
have a duty, in other words, to be socially responsible.  Others, such as 
Milton Friedman,25 Jonathan Macey,26 and Adolph Berle see CSR as 
naïve—little more than a “pious wish that something nice will come 
out of it all,” as Berle famously put it.27 
                                               
 20. Hany H. Makhlouf, Multinational Corporations and Nation-States:  Managing Shared- 
and Conflicts of Interest, 4 J. SOC. & ADMIN. SCI. 139, 141 (2017) (noting that a multinational 
corporation resembles “a federation of different companies or semi-autonomous 
subsidiaries that are, at least, partially owned and controlled by a central unit”). 
 21. Corporate social responsibility reflects “the economic, legal, ethical, and 
discretionary/philanthropic expectations society places on organizations at a given 
point in time.”  ANN K. BUCHHOLTZ & ARCHIE B. CARROLL, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY:  
ETHICS, SUSTAINABILITY, AND STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT 34 (9th ed. 2015). 
 22. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1145, 1160–61 (1932) (arguing in support of corporate social responsibility). 
 23. David Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 523, 524 (2011) (developing models of corporate social responsibility). 
 24. Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibility:  
Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1140 (2012) (“[C]orporate law today 
has little to say about a subject of great societal significance—corporate responsibility.”). 
 25. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 2–3 (describing corporate social responsibility as 
“taxation without representation” and equating the use of social values, other than 
profit maximization, in business decision making as “socialist”). 
 26. Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Social Responsibility:  A Law & Economics Perspective, 
17 CHAP. L. REV. 331, 332 (2014) (arguing that shareholder interests are presumptively 
primary and exclusive of interests of other stakeholders). 
 27. A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees:  A Note, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1365, 1368 (1932).  In the law and economics literature, the base cite is typically 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976), which developed the 
theory of shareholder primacy as a function of agency costs. 
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Efforts to use corporate law to induce MNCs to internalize the costs of 
globalization have had little legal success.28  The Working Group that drafted 
the Model Contract Clauses appears to understand this, and views contract 
terms as a way to help fill the governance gaps identified by Ruggie.29 
A.   The Model Contract Clauses 
The Model Contract Clauses seek to put teeth into CSR by providing 
contract processes that would implement such human rights standards 
as the ABA Model Business and Supplier Principles on Labor 
Trafficking and Child Labor (the “Principles”).30  “The hope,” the 
Working Group explained, “is that following the steps outlined in the 
ABA Model Principles will help eradicate labor trafficking and child 
labor from supply chains, making a difference to real people—their 
health, safety, and freedom, and in some cases, saving lives.”31 
Although motivated by concerns about human rights abuses in the 
global supply chain, the MCCs do not specify the substance of those rights.  
Rather, they leave those to the parties in specific cases, to be incorporated 
in the contract in what the Working Group refers to as a “Schedule P.”32  
In principle, the Model Contract Clauses could provide redress for 
violation of any substantive terms that seek to solve SEER problems. 
B.   Model Contract Clauses as a Contract for Procedure 
While the Model Contract Clauses do not specify substantive SEER 
goals, they do offer a series of mechanisms for increasing the likelihood 
                                               
 28. See, e.g., Order Denying Def.’s Joint Mot. to Dismiss at 1–2, Nat’l Consumers League 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2015 CA 007731 B, 2016 WL 4080541 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 22, 
2016) (finding that statements of corporate policy are merely “aspirational in nature”). 
 29. See Ruggie, supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Model Contract Clauses, supra 
note 3, at 1094 (“The foundational idea behind the present work is to move the commitments 
that companies require, whatever they may be, from corporate policy statements to the actual 
contract documents where those policies may have greater impact.”). 
 30. For a discussion of the Principles, see, for example, E. Christopher Johnson, Jr., 
Business Lawyers Are in a Unique Position to Help Their Clients Identify Supply-Chain Risks 
Involving Labor Trafficking and Child Labor, 70 BUS. LAW. 1083 (2015); see also ABA Model 
Business and Supplier Policies on Labor Trafficking and Child Labor, ABA (Jan. 9, 2019), 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/initiatives_awards/child_labor. 
 31. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 3, at 1094. 
 32. “Whatever moral and legal commitments companies want to require can be 
accommodated in what this Working Group entitles Schedule P, which the model 
clauses incorporate, but the actual content of Schedule P is beyond the scope of this 
Working Group.”  Id. at 1096.  Schedule P was chosen as a reference to the principles 
that might supply or animate the substantive standards in question.  Id. at 1096 n.13. 
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that parties achieve these goals by making them central to the SCA itself.  
Sellers under the MCCs would represent and warrant that they—and 
their “Representatives” (defined below)—have complied with Schedule P33 
and that compliance with Schedule P is a “material” term of the 
agreement.34  Noncompliance with Schedule P would, under the MCCs, 
“substantially impair[] the value of the Goods and this Agreement to Buyer” 
and would constitute “a fundamental breach of the entire Agreement.”35 
There are two gating issues with these provisions.  First, it is not clear 
whether or how a supplier (e.g., S, in the example from the 
Introduction) can assure that its suppliers and Representatives have 
complied with Schedule P.  The Model Contract Clauses define a 
“Representative” as potentially including “shareholders/partners, 
officers, directors, employees, and agents of Supplier and all 
intermediaries, subcontractors, consultants and any other person 
providing staffing for Goods or services required by this Agreement on 
behalf of Supplier.”36  The goal appears to be to assure that the norms 
and values reflected in Schedule P are driven through S to all in some 
material relationship with S, including its suppliers. 
This, in principle, is a laudable goal.  Supply chains can be quite 
long.  But one has to ask whether it is realistic to expect suppliers to 
know what their suppliers’ suppliers are up to?  In a footnote, the 
Model Contract Clauses observe that an unqualified version of this 
definition “supports [the] Buyer’s goals to allocate the risk of 
undiscovered issues to Supplier and contractually encourage Supplier 
to gather accurate information about its subcontractors.”37  Whether, 
or to what extent, it is realistic to think that a tier one supplier can do 
so as to its suppliers, its sub-suppliers, and so on, is another matter.  
Moreover, given the breadth of the definition, one might wonder whether 
it includes those in legally protected relationships with S, such as its 
attorneys.  Is S’s counsel a “Representative” under the Model Contract 
                                               
 33. Id. at 1097 (“Supplier and its subcontractors and [to Supplier’s [best] knowledge] 
the [shareholders/partners, officers, directors, employees, and] agents of Supplier and all 
intermediaries, subcontractors, consultants and any other person providing staffing for 
Goods or services required by this Agreement [on behalf of Supplier] (collectively, the 
‘Representatives’) are in compliance with Schedule P.”) (alterations in original). 
 34. Id. at 1099 (“It is a material term of this Agreement that Supplier and 
Representatives shall strictly comply with Schedule P.”). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1097 (alterations omitted). 
 37. Id. at 1097 n.15. 
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Clauses?  The broad definition suggests they might be, but they may be 
surprised to learn that. 
Second, the Model Contract Clauses treat the breach of the HR term 
(Schedule P) as a breach of terms that would otherwise involve the 
goods, themselves.  This is probably a necessary, but perhaps 
problematic, strategy because, as discussed below, specific remedies 
may not involve the goods at all.  Rather, the breach of Schedule P 
probably involves the process of their production. 
Nevertheless, the Model Contract Clauses appear to assume that 
they would be governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) or 
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods (CISG).38  But those laws were drafted not with a view toward 
affecting the behavior and norms of parties to contracts involving the 
sales of goods, but instead to provide default rules regarding the sale 
of the goods, themselves, e.g., as to their quality, quantity, price, and 
legal title.39  Because the substance of Schedule P may have nothing to 
do with the characteristics of the goods, and because specific relief for 
the breach of Schedule P may not, either, it is not difficult to imagine 
disagreement over whether either of those bodies of law apply to these 
aspects of the Model Contract Clauses. 
C.   Specific Relief under the Model Contract Clauses 
I point these issues out not to quibble with the Model Contract 
Clauses, but instead to frame the challenges underlying what are 
perhaps their most innovative features—their forms of specific relief.  
As one might expect, most of the remedial terms in the Model 
Contract Clauses involve money.  The MCCs provide for, among other 
things, liquidated damages,40 damage due to lost sales (profit) and/or 
to reputational harm, and indemnification for B’s losses due to S’s 
                                               
 38. Id. at 1096 (“The text proposed assumes that buyers are located in the United 
States and that the applicable law is the Uniform Commercial Code (the ‘U.C.C.’) or 
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (the 
‘CISG,’ a treaty to which the United States is a party).”); see also United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art. 45–52, 61–65, Apr. 
11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 59, 67–69, 70–71 [hereinafter CISG]. 
 39. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-101 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (“The 
arrangement of the present Article is in terms of contract for sale and the various steps 
of its performance.”); Id. § 2-102 (“Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article 
applies to transactions in goods.”). 
 40. See Model Contract Clauses, supra note 3, at 1103 (“[T]he parties have therefore 
agreed to liquidated damages in an amount calculated as follows: _______________.”). 
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breach of Schedule P.41  The MCCs candidly recognize, however, that 
the “[b]uyer may face challenges with respect to proving damages.  
This is common in claims for breach of contract, but Buyer may have 
special challenges with respect to the impact on its brand that results 
from violations of human rights policies.”42  Moreover, collecting 
money judgments against a foreign promisor may be difficult. 
The Model Contract Clauses contain three provisions articulating 
specific relief: 
(1) First, they would have the Supplier agree that, in the event of a 
breach of Schedule P, Buyer may “obtain an injunction with respect 
to Supplier’s noncompliance with Schedule P, and the parties agree 
that noncompliance with Schedule P causes Buyer great and 
irreparable harm for which Buyer has no adequate remedy at law 
and that the public interest would be served by injunctive and other 
equitable relief.”43  (“Model Contract Clauses Injunction”). 
(2) Second, the Supplier would agree that the Buyer may “require Supplier 
to remove an employee or employees and/or other Representatives.”44  
(“Model Contract Clauses Employee/Representative Termination”). 
(3) Third, the Supplier would agree that the Buyer may “require 
Supplier to terminate a subcontract.”  (“Model Contract Clauses 
Subcontract Termination” and, with the Model Contract Clauses 
Employee/Representative Termination,” the “Termination Powers”).45 
While it is difficult to know, empirically, whether these sorts of terms 
are truly novel in supply chain agreements, it is not difficult to imagine 
that they will be challenging for courts to enforce by way of injunction 
or specific performance, which I explain in the next Part. 
II.    SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
The Model Contract Clauses appear to contemplate both specific 
performance and injunctive relief, although they articulate only the 
latter directly.  We tend to think that specific performance and 
injunctive relief are the same, legal substitutes for one another.46  And, 
                                               
 41. Id. at 1103–04. 
 42. Id. at 1103 n.42. 
 43. Id. at 1102. 
 44. Id. at 1103. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Engemoen v. Rea, 26 F.2d 576, 578 (8th Cir. 1928) (“An injunction decree 
enjoining the breach of a contract is in effect a decree for its specific performance, 
and the principles which govern the granting of both remedies are generally the 
same.”); RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW § 11:36 (2018) 
(“One can readily see that an injunction may well be the reverse side of the coin of 
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while they overlap significantly in their necessary elements and their 
functions, they are not coterminous.  Instead, they appear to be 
doctrinally distinct in two respects that might matter to courts asked to 
enforce them in this context and to parties that consider using them. 
A.   Doctrine and its Limits 
Contract doctrine conventionally presumes that specific performance 
is an “exceptional remedy,”47 to be granted only if damages would not 
be adequate.48  U.S. courts will grant specific performance in cases where 
the aggrieved party can show that goods are “unique” or in “other 
proper circumstances.”49  The underlying logic of specific performance 
derives from the view that substitutionary remedies—money damages—
will usually be adequate.  As Farnsworth put it, “[o]ur system of contract 
remedies is not directed at the compulsion of promisors to prevent 
breach; it is aimed, instead, at relief to promisees to redress breach.”50 
The principal point of doctrinal overlap between specific 
performance, as a contract remedy, and injunctive relief is “adequacy”:  
Both remedies are said to be limited to circumstances where money 
damages would be “inadequate.”  In the case of injunctions, the element 
is referred to as “irreparable injury,”51 but it has substantially the same 
import:  a court must do something, the claimant says, because money 
itself will not be a sufficient substitute.   
Yet, “adequacy” is a problematic standard.  The classic case for specific 
performance of a contract term—conveying title to real property—is not 
                                               
specific performance:  forbidding a party from taking an action may well be all the 
performance that a party expects.”). 
 47. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient 
Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 1016 (2005). 
 48. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 357, 359–60, 366–67 (AM. LAW INST. 
1979) (stating it is within the court’s discretion to decide if damages would not be adequate). 
 49. Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Specific Performance of Sale of Goods Under UCC § 2-716, 
26 A.L.R.4th § 2[a] (1983); see also Jason S. Kirwan, Appraising a Presumption:  A Modern Look 
at the Doctrine of Specific Performance in Real Estate Contracts, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 697, 701 
(2005) (“It is also important to note that the general trend in U.S. contract law favors 
increased latitude for trial courts to grant specific performance as a redress for breach.”). 
 50. 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.1 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasis omitted). 
 51. To obtain an injunction, a plaintiff must in theory show: 
[1] Success (or, in the case of a preliminary injunction, likely success) on the merits; 
[2] Irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief; 
[3] The balance of equities tips in plaintiff’s favor; and 
[4] An injunction is “in the public interest.” 
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
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necessarily one in which money damages are inadequate.  Deriving a 
dollar value for the property in question may be difficult, but it is not 
obviously more speculative than deriving damages in cases where the 
aggrieved party is a new business that lacks a track record of 
profitability.52  Conversely, the case in which money damages would be 
highly inadequate—breach of a personal services contract—is one in 
which a court would almost certainly not order specific performance.53   
Not surprisingly, analysts view the adequacy standard skeptically.  
Melvin Eisenberg considered “inadequacy” as a predicate to obtaining 
specific performance to be a “virtually dead” rule.54  Those who study 
equitable remedies say much the same.  Douglas Laycock, for example, 
has argued that the “irreparable injury” standard:  
does not describe what the cases do, and it cannot account for the 
results.  Injunctions are routine, and damages are never adequate 
unless the court wants them to be.  Courts can freely turn to the 
precedents granting injunctions or the precedents denying 
injunctions, depending on whether they want to hold the legal 
remedy adequate or inadequate.  Whether they want to hold the 
legal remedy adequate depends on whether they have some other 
reason to deny the equitable remedy, and it is these other reasons 
that drive the decisions.55 
                                               
 52. See Chung v. Kaonohi Ctr. Co., 618 P.2d 283, 291 (Haw. 1980) (finding that 
recovery should not be denied simply because the business is new so long as the 
plaintiff can show future profits with reasonable certainty). 
 53. Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 1017, 1036 (“[A] decree ordering an employee to 
specifically perform an employment contract would seem too much like involuntary servitude 
or peonage.”); see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 169 
(1991) (“The reason for [the rule that employment contracts will not be specifically enforced 
against employees] is a substantive law commitment to free labor.  Despite the vast social 
distance between chattel slavery and specific performance of contracts with professional 
athletes and entertainers, similar policies apply to both . . . .  An order to work on pain of 
contempt produces servitude that is involuntary when the services are performed.”). 
 54. Compare Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 1017 (“The adequacy rule, as a rule that 
simply bars the gate, is virtually dead and probably should be.  The commentators also 
generally agree that specific performance is granted more freely today than traditional 
doctrine suggests.”), with Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 687, 703 (1990) (“Damages are inadequate if plaintiff cannot use them 
to replace the specific thing he has lost.  This is by far the most important rule in 
determining the doctrinal relationship among remedies.”). 
 55. Laycock, supra note 54, at 692. 
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B.   “Other Reasons” for and Against Specific Relief 
This, then, invites the question:  What are those other reasons?  One 
way to answer the question is to map four inchoate, but important, 
factors underlying the substantive or policy disputes at issue.  These 
are whether the specific relief sought is (1) affirmative or (2) negative; 















Plotting specific relief in this way helps to reveal, and perhaps helps 
to explain, two anxieties that seem to constrain judges who are asked 
to grant specific relief:  the anxiety of indenture and the anxiety of 
entanglement.  The anxiety of indenture reflects the deeply-held belief 
that specific performance is inappropriate in personal services 
contracts on free-labor grounds.  Having abolished slavery, any effort 
                                               
 56. This functional analysis would comport with the trend toward recognizing that 
equitable power—the power to enjoin or order performance—reaches both persons and 
property.  Historically, it was limited to property.  Shreve, supra note 13, at 386 (“Until 
recently, equity’s protections were confined to property as opposed to personal rights.”). 
 57. I note that it is not clear whether an attachment or similar judicial lien would 
be a legal or equitable remedy.  Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 
204, 214 (2002) (characterizing a claim for restitution under ERISA as “restitution 
that . . . is not equitable—the imposition of a constructive trust or equitable lien on 
particular property—but legal—the imposition of personal liability for the benefits 
that they conferred upon respondents”). 
 58. Pappan Enters., Inc. v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 806 (3d Cir. 
1998) (discussing “irreparable harm [that] Hardee’s and MRO would continue to 
suffer as a result of Pappan’s non-consensual use of the ROY ROGERS [trade]marks”). 
 59. See, e.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83 (1974) (relying on “the traditional 
unwillingness of courts of equity to enforce contracts for personal service either at the 
behest of the employer or of the employee”); Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 318 (7th Cir. 
1894) (holding that a decree of specific performance for breach of an employment 
contract would be involuntary servitude); The Case of Mary Clark, 1 Blackf. 122, 123, 
126 (Ind. 1821) (denying specific enforcement of a promise to serve employer for 
twenty years); Laycock, supra note 54, at 745 (stating that the court will not grant 
specific performance for personal services contracts). 
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to order a person to perform a promised service may look like 
peonage—a shameful condition abetted by long-discredited judges.60  
As Laycock has observed, “the difficulty of coercing close personal 
relationships is a powerful reason for denying specific relief, even if 
damage remedies are inadequate.”61 
The anxiety of entanglement stems from fears that judges cannot 
plausibly intervene in the day-to-day work and lives of parties.  As 
Schwartz has noted, “specific performance [is] an unattractive remedy 
in cases in which the promisor’s performance is complex, because the 
promisor is more likely to render a defective performance when that 
performance is coerced, and the defectiveness of complex 
performances is sometimes difficult to establish in court.”62  Even the 
most Herculean judge cannot get off the bench and run the company.63 
                                               
 60. The Peonage Cases addressed the problem that arose after Reconstruction of 
southern courts convicting African Americans of a “crime” derived from breach of a debt 
or other contract and indenturing them to the creditor as the remedy.  See, e.g., Pollock 
v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 24 (1944); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29 (1942); Bailey v. 
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911).  Although Congress had forbidden peonage in the 
wake of the Civil War (Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 546 (1867) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012), 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2012))), southern courts continued to defy 
it.  See United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527, 529–30 (1944) (reversing a lower court 
holding that one could not be convicted under the Anti-Peonage Act for merely arresting 
someone with the intent of returning them to peonage).  See generally William Wirt Howe, 
The Peonage Cases, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 279 (1904) (discussing lower court decisions under 
federal Anti-Peonage Act).  Some judges have suggested that involuntary servitude had 
to be akin to slavery in the specific sense of subjecting workers to physical or legal 
coercion.  See James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional 
Law of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1514 (2010). 
 61. Laycock, supra note 54, at 748. 
 62. Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 277 (1979).  
Perhaps the most articulate expression of this anxiety arose in connection with federal 
efforts to enjoin steelworker strikes in the 1950s: 
No doubt a District Court is normally charged with the duty of independently 
shaping the details of a decree when sitting in equity in controversies that involve 
simple and relatively few factors—factors, that is, far less in number, less 
complicated and less interrelated than in the case before us.  But a court is not 
qualified to devise schemes for the conduct of an industry so as to assure the 
securing of necessary defense materials.  It is not competent to sit in judgment 
on the existing distribution of factors in the conduct of an integrated industry 
to ascertain whether it can be segmented with a view to its reorganization for the 
supply exclusively, or even primarily, of government-needed materials. 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 50–51 (1959) (Frankfurter 
& Harlan, JJ., concurring) (per curiam). 
 63. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 239 (1986) (discussing the approach of a 
hypothetical “Herculean” judge to judicial action).  Interestingly, although there is 
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These anxieties are most severe in the lower right-hand quadrant of the 
figure above; and mildest in the upper left.  In some cases, the specific 
relief envisioned by the MCCs may take judges closer to the lower right-
hand zone than they would like.  In that case, they would be unlikely to 
enforce such terms.  The balance of this Part explains why; the following 
Part offers some alternative ways of thinking about the work that the 
MCCs, or other specific relief provisions, can perform in this context. 
C.   Doctrinal Distinctions 
The anxieties of indenture and entanglement have no strong 
doctrinal locus, even as they may matter to judges asked to enforce (or 
to refrain from enforcing) provisions like the MCCs.  Doctrinally, courts 
at least talk as if “adequacy” is the central question for both specific 
performance and injunctions, though the adequacy in question is that of 
the remedy, and not of the court’s capacity to effectuate it.  Still, there are 
doctrinal distinctions between injunction and specific performance that 
should matter in the context of HR terms, in part because judges may use 
them to attempt to manage these anxieties.  This Part looks at some of the 
salient doctrinal distinctions in this context. 
1.  “Other proper circumstances”—specific relief and supply chain agreements 
Specific performance would appear to be easier to obtain than an 
injunction, as and to the extent it does not induce concerns about 
judicial compulsion of services or entanglement in personal 
relations.64  To obtain specific performance under the UCC, for 
example, the plaintiff need only show under section 2-716 that goods 
                                               
ample literature on Dworkin’s famous enthusiasm for the wisdom and power of judges, 
see, for example, W. Bradley Wendel, Sally Yates, Ronald Dworkin, and the Best View of the 
Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 78, 79–80 (2017), none of it seems to focus on the 
mechanism by which judges would most directly exercise that power, specific relief.  
Perhaps this reflects Dworkin’s interest in “serious” matters of constitutional 
interpretation, as distinct from seemingly more trivial matters of contract enforcement.  
See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (analyzing different 
rights from a philosophy of law approach).  I leave that project to another day. 
 64. See Nemer Jeep-Eagle, Inc. v. Jeep-Eagle Sales Corp., 992 F.2d 430, 433 (2d Cir. 
1993) (citing Travellers Int’l AG v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1087, 1104 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989)) (observing that test for specific performance is “more flexible” than 
the test for a preliminary injunction).  See generally Shreve, supra note 13, at 387 (“The 
injunction does occupy an inferior hierarchical position in the law of remedies.  In an 
action for damages, plaintiff need not establish that the harm he suffers is substantial.  
To obtain an injunction, however, plaintiff must show that the equitable remedy is 
necessary to avert substantial harm.”). 
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are “unique” or that there are “other proper circumstances.”65  Because 
we can assume that the goods in most cases involving the MCCs will 
not be unique, the questions are whether breach of an HR term 
constitutes “other proper circumstances” and how high a hurdle that 
sets for a plaintiff-buyer. 
It is safe to say that the drafters of section 2-716 probably did not have HR 
terms in mind when they used the words “other proper circumstances.”  
Section 2-716 “seeks to further a more liberal attitude than some courts 
have shown in connection with the specific performance of contracts of 
sale.”66  But, the main example given is the inability to cover—meaning that 
the focus is on the goods and not the conditions under which they were 
produced.67  Where no market alternative is “adequate,” specific 
performance would be “other proper circumstances.” 
 Thus, while courts may order sellers to perform under long-term supply 
contracts, they may also worry about their real power to do so.  Courts are 
not necessarily unwilling to enforce such terms merely because they 
involve repeat performance.68  But, as Nathan Oman has observed, 
“specific performance represents a greater intrusion into personal 
freedom than do money damages,”69  and this certainly seems to be true 
in long-term supply contracts.  Although there appear to be no published 
opinions involving injunctions for breach of HR terms, case law suggests 
that courts are uncomfortable granting injunctions when the court faces 
the prospect of long-term engagement with the defendant.70   
                                               
 65. U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). 
 66. Id. § 2-716 cmt. 1. 
 67. Id. § 2-716 cmt. 2 (“[I]nability to cover is strong evidence of ‘other proper 
circumstances.’”). 
 68. See Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33, 39–40 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding 
that a long-term contract makes it difficult to estimate damages and specific performance 
offers an efficient way to attain the ends of justice); Copylease Corp. of Am. v. Memorex 
Corp., 408 F. Supp. 758, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (recognizing that unique goods are an 
exception to the general rule that limits specific performance as a remedy). 
 69. Nathan B. Oman, The Failure of Economic Interpretations of the Law of Contract 
Damages, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 829, 869 (2007). 
 70. Soinco v. NKAP provides an illustrative example outside the UCC.  See Soinco v. 
NKAP, Zürich Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Award ZHK 273/95 ¶ 173 (May 31, 
1996), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960531s1.html (providing an example of a 
long-term supply contract).  Here, an international arbitration set in Zurich 
determined that there was no basis for claims of specific performance in Russian law, 
and so the buyer’s claim for specific performance was denied.  The buyers requested 
specific performance of several contracts of sale; if ordered, the seller, a Russian 
aluminum producer, would have had to produce and deliver aluminum to the buyers 
for between eight and ten years.  Id. ¶ 349.  The tribunal found that it “fail[ed] to see 
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 Conversely, if the problem could easily be cashed out, any intrusion 
by the court into a party’s operations may be problematic. In Healthcare 
Corp. of America v. Data Rx Management, Inc.,71 for example, a health-
care claims management company allegedly held funds that should 
have been remitted to a pharmacy benefits provider pursuant to a 
supply chain agreement.72  Although the management company did 
not dispute that it held the funds that it owed to the benefits provider,73 
the court declined to grant the injunction: 
Data Rx has alleged that the trust on which its supply chain is based will 
erode if a preliminary injunction is not granted.  It has not, however, 
(1) presented any sworn statements from pharmacies stating that such 
a chilling effect is taking place, or (2) differentiated this supply chain 
from any other where suppliers take on financial risk by dispensing 
products in advance of receiving payment.  In short, Data Rx has not 
submitted proof of loss of reputation or demonstrated that its pharmacy 
network is different from “other types of commerce in such a way that 
normal breach of contract remedies could not provide a remedy.”74 
The court in Data Rx recognized that the benefits provider, the party 
seeking the injunction, may well have had a claim, but denied the 
injunction because liability could easily be established at a later point 
in the litigation, and it apparently faced no collection risk in the event 
                                               
how specific performance could be an appropriate remedy for buyers in this case” 
because “[the buyers] can hardly expect to be able, under the New York Convention 
or otherwise, to have an award enforced in Russia . . . for the next eight or ten 
years . . . .”  Id.  The tribunal denied the buyer’s claim for specific performance because 
ordering performance would require constant supervision, and thus confirmed that 
difficulty of enforcement would influence a court’s decision to order specific 
performance under the CISG.  See id. ¶¶ 348–49; see also Nayiri Boghossian, A 
Comparative Study of Specific Performance Provisions in the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 65 (Nov. 1999) 
(unpublished Master of Laws thesis, McGill University), https://www.collectionscanad 
a.gc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ64262.pdf. 
 71. No. 2:12-2910 (KM), 2013 WL 1314736 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2013). 
 72. See id. at *1. 
 73. Id. at *4 (“HCA does not meaningfully dispute that it is holding a significant 
amount of money due to pharmacies who are not parties to this action.  HCA concedes 
that Data Rx has sent invoices for the Pharmacy Charges and Processing Fee, and it 
has conceded at oral argument that it does not challenge the amount of these invoices.  
HCA admits that it has been paid by Middlesex County for past prescriptions filled by 
the pharmacies.  HCA has not turned these funds over to Data Rx.”). 
 74. Id. at *5 (quoting Bennington Foods LLC v. St. Croix Renaissance, Grp., LLP, 
528 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
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it won.75  Moreover, the request for the preliminary injunction was 
made as part of a counterclaim to a complaint alleging breach of one or 
more of “numerous” contracts that governed the parties’ relationships.76  
It is not difficult to imagine that the lower court here did not wish to 
become entangled in the complex relationships of the parties, especially 
when it did not need to do so.   
This is not to suggest that buyers could never specifically enforce HR 
terms on a theory that they present “other proper circumstances.”  I mean 
only that courts may worry about their ability to do so without becoming 
impermissibly entangled in the affairs of the parties, or required to 
indenture persons over whom they have little, if any, direct control. 
Consider a variation on the example from the Introduction.  Assume 
that S employs a manager “M” who knows that S has agreed not to use 
prison labor under its SCA with B.  Yet, M also knows that he cannot 
provide the promised goods at the promised price without using below-
market labor, and so he leases inmates from a nearby prison, in breach 
of the SCA.  Assume further that B learns of this and demands that S 
terminate M pursuant to a provision akin to the Termination Powers in 
the Model Contract Clauses.  S refuses to terminate M.  Then what?  
Would a U.S. court order a promisor (S) to terminate an employee who, 
in S’s judgment, has not committed an offense that creates grounds for 
termination?  How could S do so without avoiding the risk of collateral 
litigation for wrongful termination or interference from M?77   
It is hard to know what to do with any of the standard doctrinal tests 
on these facts.  It is easy to see that money damages might be 
inadequate, but that hardly tells a court how to balance the equities or 
otherwise to achieve some rough justice.  Indeed, it is not hard to 
imagine a judge being very reluctant to provide affirmative relief 
                                               
 75. E.g., id. at *1 ("That is not to say that Data Rx's claims could not prevail on summary 
judgment or at trial, but at present, they do not furnish a basis for injunctive relief.”); id. at 
*5 (noting that counsel represented that following an anticipated sale of the counterclaim-
defendant, “the combined company is projected to have significantly greater revenues than 
HCA alone”).  The Data Rx court’s conclusion was also motivated in part by the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Grupo Mexicano that a preliminary injunction should not ordinarily issue 
for a breach of contract claim, even where the defendant may be preferentially transferring 
assets in anticipation of the litigation.  Id. at *4 (citing Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. 
v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 332–33 (1999)). 
 76. Id. at *2 (observing that the parties’ “relationships are governed by numerous 
contracts”). 
 77. If M were a "key" employee, the problem would be even more complicated.  
For a discussion on the enforceability of “key man” clauses generally, see In re Orion 
Pictures Corp., 4 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1993). 
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because enforcing these terms might enmesh a judge in complex 
personnel matters.  While B may believe that the normative force of 
the underlying dispute constitutes “other proper circumstances,” it is 
easy to see why a court may disagree.  Anxieties of indenture and 
entanglement are likely to be high, here. 
2. The “public interest” and specific relief 
A second, and perhaps more interesting, doctrinal difference 
between specific performance and injunctive relief appears to involve 
the role of the “public interest.”  There is no formal requirement that 
courts entertaining a request for specific performance of a contract 
term consider the “public interest.”  By contrast, when courts consider 
whether to grant (or deny) injunctive relief (especially preliminary 
injunctions), they may do so.78 
At one level, the difference is not surprising, since we typically 
assume that breach of contract problems are largely “private” in 
nature.79  While a few courts have considered the public’s interest in 
granting specific performance, they appear to be the exception.80  If 
the “public interest” is an element of a party’s request for specific 
performance, it will be because it is a predicate to the enforceability of 
the substantive term, such as a covenant not to compete,81 and not 
necessarily of the remedy. 
Because specific relief is typically viewed as emanating from a court’s 
equity power, public interest and specific relief have long been linked 
and debated.  The alliance has roots in the Supreme Court’s statement 
in 1937 that “[c]ourts of equity may, and frequently do, go much 
farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public 
interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are 
                                               
 78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 357 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“In 
granting [injunctive] relief, as well as in denying it, a court may take into consideration 
the public interest.”). 
 79. See, e.g., Orion Pictures Corp., 4 F.3d at 1097 (demonstrating the breach of 
contract dispute between Orion and Showtime, private parties); see also Daniel 
Markovitz, Theories of the Common Law of Contracts, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Sept. 11, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contracts-theories. 
 80. See Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. City of Louisville, 126 S.W.2d 840, 843 (Ky. 1939) 
(ordering the railroad to specifically perform the contract to make grade crossing safe 
in support of the public interest). 
 81. DJR Assocs., LLC v. Hammonds, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1208, 1232 (N.D. Ala. 2017) (noting 
that when considering whether to grant injunction, the court observed that “the enforceability 
of non-compete covenants touches on the conflicting fundamental public policies of many 
states”). 
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involved.”82  A leading treatise observes that the “public interest” 
element of injunctive relief “is another way of inquiring whether there 
are policy considerations that bear on whether the order should 
issue.”83  Even within the sphere of private ordering, observers have 
argued that courts should account for the moral and policy 
implications of using specific performance.84 
This both frames the central issue in the enforcement of HR terms, 
and invites difficult questions.  One of the key problems with such 
terms will be their “public” character.  Because they involve or affect 
persons who are not parties to the contract, they may require an 
assessment of interests that differ from those in ordinary contract 
disputes, and that may differ from those of the parties to the contract.  
Whose public interest are we talking about—the buyer’s, the seller’s or 
the seller’s employees?  How is a court supposed to select and, once it 
does so, how is a court supposed to know what the interest is?  If, as 
seems likely in a global supply chain agreement, the employees at issue 
are in a foreign nation, how is a court in the United States (whether a 
state court or a U.S. district court in diversity) supposed to know what 
the public interest is there?  Surely, it cannot be the same as the public 
interest in the United States.  
Consider, again, the example from the Introduction.  Assume S’s 
manager, M, has leased prisoners from a local prison run by a relative, and 
it is common in S’s nation both to use leased prison labor and to tolerate 
intra-family dealing.  Both are, however, violations of Schedule P in the SCA 
between S and B.  B is embarrassed when the facts are revealed and seeks 
an injunction to enforce Schedule P and stop S from this practice.   
                                               
 82. See Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937). 
 83. 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:  CIVIL 
§ 2948.4 (3d ed. 2013).  The treatise continues: 
Thus, when granting preliminary relief, courts frequently emphasize that the 
public interest will be furthered by the injunction.  Conversely, preliminary relief 
will be denied if the court finds that the public interest would be injured were an 
injunction to be issued . . . .  If the court finds there is no public interest supporting 
preliminary relief, that conclusion also supports denial of any injunction, even if 
the public interest would not be harmed by one.  Consequently, an evaluation of 
the public interest should be given considerable weight in determining whether a 
motion for a preliminary injunction should be granted. 
Id. 
 84. See Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 978 (“Actual specific performance should be 
awarded unless a special moral, policy, or experiential reason suggests otherwise in a 
given class of cases . . . .”). 
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B may start by pointing to language adapted from the MCCs, that the 
parties “agree that . . . the public interest would be served by injunctive 
and other equitable relief.”85  S may respond by producing an expert 
witness who explains that local law and custom tolerate S’s conduct, and 
it is therefore consistent with local public policy.86  B may then produce 
an expert witness from a watchdog group who testifies to the opposite 
effect.  S may retort by arguing that an injunction halting the use of 
prisoners would force S to shut down, leaving all of its workers—some 
of whom are not leased inmates—out of work, a point to which B and its 
experts may have no good response. 
At this point, it should be apparent that from a U.S. perspective, there 
are competing public interest goals at stake, and that some of them will 
be virtually impenetrable to a U.S. judge.  On one hand, there is a strong 
public interest in assuring the decent treatment of workers and (perhaps) 
in eschewing the use of prison labor.  On the other hand, courts are wary 
of taking action that may have the effect of eliminating jobs.87   
And, this assumes that a U.S. sense of public interest is appropriate.  
But why should we assume that?  Even if, as the hypothetical stipulates, 
the parties have chosen U.S. law, that does not necessarily mean that 
they have chosen U.S. public policy.  Indeed, B may have bargained for 
the HR terms in Schedule P precisely because it understood that public 
policy in S’s location tolerated conduct considered normatively 
offensive in the United States.  To ask a court to make these choices 
risks entangling the court not only in the business and affairs of the 
parties, but also the public policies of their respective nations. 
In the face of these difficulties, a court may be tempted to do 
nothing.  But this would permit S to shirk its responsibilities, to 
embarrass B, and to harm those the HR term sought to protect.  While 
                                               
 85. See Model Contract Clauses, supra note 3, at 1102. 
 86. S may also point out that leasing prison labor remains a feature of the U.S. 
economy.  See Ifeoma Ajunwa & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Combating Discrimination 
Against the Formerly Incarcerated in the Labor Market, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1385, 1385 (2018) 
(“[P]rivate corporations rely on and profit from low-wage prison labor to argue that 
the state penal institutions that lease prisoners to such corporations should push for 
contractual agreements that stipulate that corporations relying on prison labor must 
revoke policies that bar employing the formerly incarcerated upon their release.”). 
 87. See Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970) (refusing to 
enjoin operation of a cement plant that employed over three hundred people); see also 
Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 338 (1933) (refusing to enjoin 
pollution from municipal sewer plant and stating that “[w]here an important public 
interest would be prejudiced, the reasons for denying the injunction may be 
compelling”) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
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B may have other remedies, including a liquidation of damages and 
indemnification, those will not necessarily have any greater bite than 
specific relief.  And, while B could walk away, rescission may have little 
remedial effect.  Switching to a new supplier is likely to raise B’s costs 
and may leave S free to continue to use forced labor. 
The bottom line, then, is that specific relief to enforce the remedial 
provisions of the MCCs presents a serious problem:  courts will find 
these terms difficult to use to remedy breach of HR terms, regardless 
of the doctrinal path taken.  Moreover, these paths provide little 
guidance for judges who may understandably fear forcing individuals to 
work (or to fire employees on uncertain grounds) or becoming 
entangled in problems that they feel are beyond their power or 
expertise.  But this then invites a more basic question:  If courts may not 
enforce specific relief for breach of HR terms, why use the MCCs at all? 
III.    RESTRUCTURING AND RELATIONALISM 
As is often the case with contract terms, there is usually life beyond the 
black letter law.  In the case of specific relief for breach of HR terms, that 
life may emanate from an analogy to the work courts do in institutional 
reform litigation and may reflect the relational effects that specific 
performance terms can have, independent of their doctrinal value. 
A.   Institutional Reform Litigation 
Although courts addressing contract disputes may not immediately 
see it this way, problems presented by the breach of HR terms in supply 
chain agreements will share certain important characteristics with 
litigants’ demands in institutional reform litigation (IRL).88  
Institutional reform, or “public law” litigation, uses courts to correct 
the behavior of errant public agencies such as police departments, 
child-welfare systems, and public schools.89  Structural injunctions in 
this context address a broad range of the operations of government 
agency defendants.  These decrees are most strongly identified with 
civil rights claims, but they can be found in other areas.90  These 
                                               
 88. The discussion in this subsection draws on Kathleen G. Noonan, Jonathan C. 
Lipson & William H. Simon, Reforming Institutions:  The Judicial Function in Bankruptcy 
and Public Law Litigation, 94 IND. L.J. 491, 493–94 (2019); see also Fiss, supra note 15. 
 89. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281, 1303–04, 1303 n.93 (1976) (noting that public law litigation molds public 
perception of the legal system). 
 90. They have occurred in many complex environmental controversies.  E.g., 
CHARLES M. HAAR, MASTERING BOSTON HARBOR:  COURTS, DOLPHINS, AND IMPERILED 
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litigations are most closely identified with the federal courts, but a 
substantial number of structural decrees have emerged from state 
courts, including some of the most ambitious.91 
Like all forms of specific relief, IRL asks a court to order a party to 
do something, or to refrain from doing something, or some of both.92  
Like the Termination Powers under the Model Contract Clauses, the 
“something” in IRL is likely to involve governance and management of 
the defendant.  In both IRL and HR terms, the underlying breach 
probably involves a failure of assurances (whether through positive law 
or contract) about normatively sensitive matters, such as the treatment 
of workers or the environment.  In both cases, ordinary remedies, in 
particular money damages, are unlikely to be satisfactory.  While IRL 
does not involve formal contract, courts in both contexts grapple with 
failed promises that reflect contested public policy choices and try to 
craft a set of workable remedies acceptable to the parties and those 
affected by their undertakings. 
In most cases, IRL results not in a simple injunction enforcing a 
governmental obligation, or enjoining a governmental practice, but 
instead a consent decree negotiated by the parties against the 
backdrop of the threat of litigation or a deliberate judicial decision to 
ignore a material grievance.93  In its earlier days, consent decrees were 
often a collection of many specific rules.  A decree with respect to 
prison conditions might, for example, specify the minimum space for 
                                               
WATERS 3 (2005) [hereinafter HAAR, MASTERING BOSTON HARBOR] (discussing the 
court-induced clean-up of Boston Harbor).  They also have a long lineage in antitrust 
law.  See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE:  WHY LESS IS MORE (2007) (focusing on the history of consent decree ligation 
in antitrust law).  And they have some resemblance to recent practice in which 
corporations agree to submit to monitoring and to adopt compliance procedures in 
return for deferral of prosecution for violation of, for example, the securities laws or 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL:  
HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 240, 267 (2014). 
 91. E.g., Perez v. Bos. Hous. Auth., 400 N.E.2d 1231, 1234 (Mass. 1980) (approving 
decree reforming the Boston Housing Authority); HAAR, MASTERING BOSTON HARBOR, 
supra note 90, at 3 (noting that the Boston Harbor clean-up was judicially supervised); 
CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE:  RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES 8–9 
(1996) (discussing the decades-long judicial efforts to induce reform of exclusionary 
zoning practices in New Jersey). 
 92. See Chayes, supra note 89, at 1292 (discussing the importance of equitable relief 
in public law litigation). 
 93. See generally Noonan, Lipson & Simon, supra note 88, at 527. 
2019] SPECIFIC RELIEF AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1775 
 
cells or the temperature of water in the showers.94  Modern decrees 
may still contain some such rules, but they tend to focus on general 
management functions of self-monitoring, assessment, transparency, 
and accountability, often derived through agreement of the parties, 
expert guidance, or both.95  An important goal of the decree is a 
higher-functioning organization that is sufficiently stable to self-
correct based on a commitment to, and investment in, ongoing 
internal quality improvement practices and policies.96 
The core requirements of framework decrees concern management 
practices of policymaking, monitoring, and reassessment.  While each 
of these may have different characteristics in IRL than they would in 
disputes over the breach of HR terms, it is not hard to imagine courts 
using these techniques to address the breach of human rights or other 
terms involving social, economic, or environmental welfare.  In the 
event of a dispute over breach of HR terms, the Model Contract 
Clauses on specific relief will facilitate each. 
The use of a specific enforcement mechanism in the SCA will, for 
example, signal a policy commitment by the seller to do (or to refrain 
from doing) certain activities.  Obviously, breach calls its commitment 
to that policy into question, but to have articulated it in the first 
instance provides a basis from which a court and the parties may craft 
statements of policy that the parties consider workable. 
Monitoring may be equally important.  IRL consent decrees often 
provide that the defendant agrees that a third-party expert will have 
access to the defendant’s operations and personnel, such as front-line 
staff, in order to determine how underlying problems arise, whether 
the proposed remedies in the consent decree are effective and, if not, 
insights into how to modify the decree to increase its likelihood of 
success.97  Because the monitor is appointed by the court, she is likely 
less susceptible to bias than a party-appointed expert.  Because her 
                                               
 94. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE 
MODERN STATE:  HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 40–41 (1998) 
(discussing decrees that “specify many requirements in . . . painstaking or excruciating 
detail[, including] the wattage of the light bulbs in the cells, the frequency of showers, 
and the caloric content of meals”). 
 95. See, e.g., Kathleen G. Noonan et al., Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare 
State:  Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 523, 524 (2009) 
(explaining the evolution of decrees in the context of child welfare cases). 
 96. See id. at 530–31 (discussing past problems with poor functioning decrees). 
 97. See Noonan, Lipson & Simon, supra note 88, at 530. 
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appointment would be in a consent decree, a party’s refusal to 
cooperate with the monitor may be grounds for a finding of contempt. 
The Model Contract Clauses do not provide for third-party 
monitoring, but could easily do so.  There is a growing field of experts 
who monitor companies for human rights compliance.98  If (or to the 
extent) parties do not contract for a human-rights monitor, a court that 
seeks to craft a consent decree may look to certification regimes that 
have already begun to develop in this context to guide the monitor’s 
work.  For example, the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) provides its own certification specifically dedicated to social 
responsibility (ISO 26000).99  Many organizations indicate that they can 
certify companies and factories in these standards.100  These include but 
are not limited to:  SGS International Certification services,101 DNV Det 
Norske Veritas,102 BVQI Bureau Veritas Quality International,103 Intertek 
Testing Services,104 and TUV Rheinland Ltd.105 
This monitoring and certification function then makes it possible 
for the parties to assess and reassess compliance with the goals of the 
                                               
 98. See, e.g., ISO 26000—Social Responsibility, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, 
https://www.c2ccertified.org/get-certified/product-certification (last visited June 1, 
2019) (providing businesses guidance on how to “operate in a socially responsible way”).  
Of course, certification programs do not always work.  See Jonathan Webb, Supply Chain 
Audits Work for Corporations, but Not the Planet, Says New Report, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2017, 
11:40 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ jwebb/2017/01/16/supply-chain-audits-
work-for-corporations-but-not-the-planet-says -new-report (arguing that compliance 
certification of corporations is ultimately ineffective because facilities that pass 
compliance audits may still have substantial human rights violations). 
 99. Id. 
 100. SA 8000—Social Accountability Certification, SGS, https://www.sgs.com/en 
/sustainability/social-sustainability/audit-certification-and-verification/sa-8000-certifi 
cation-social-accountability (last visited June 1, 2019). 
 101. See id. (noting that an organization can certify to SA 8000 with an SGS audit). 
 102. Corporate Sustainability in DNV GL, DNV GL, https://www.dnvgl.com/about/ 
sustainability (last visited June 1, 2019) (noting that DNVL GL’s businesses are certified 
according to ISO 9001 standard and work toward sustainable development goals). 
 103. See Social Responsibility:  Strengthen Your Company’s Reputation, BUREAU VERITAS 
CERTIFICATION, https://www.bureauveritas.com/home/about-us/our-business/certifi 
cation/sustainability/social-responsibility (last visited June 1, 2019) (noting that Bureau 
Veritas is an independent organization that performs social responsibility audits). 
 104. See Certification, INTEREK, http://www.intertek.com/certification (last visited 
June 1, 2019) (advertising that Interek offers certification programs for environmental 
and social accountability compliance). 
 105. See Certification and Auditing Services for Social Responsibility, TÜV RHEINLAND, 
https://www.tuv.com/usa/en/social-responsibility.html (last visited June 1, 2019) 
(offering services to assess and certify companies’ compliance with social responsibility 
and fair working conditions). 
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original HR term.  In IRL, for example, the Seattle police settlement 
prescribes creation of a Community Police Commission with broad 
representation to review performance data and recommend policy 
changes.106  Ecosystem decrees sometimes mandate increased use of 
“adaptive management.”107  For example, the San Joaquin River 
Restoration decree altered the defendants’ water management practices 
to require a more rapid and nuanced response to indications of danger 
to the fish population.108 
The emphasis on provisionality and reassessment leads some courts 
to mandate explicit experimentation.  The New York police decree 
required the defendant to undertake a one-year “pilot project” with 
patrol officers wearing body-worn cameras in one precinct in each of 
the city’s five boroughs.109  At the end of the year, the monitor was 
directed to report on results and deliberate with the parties over 
whether the practice should be adopted generally.110 
In none of these examples do courts in IRL manage or direct the 
operations of a defendant agency.  Instead, the consent decree 
provides a framework of procedures by which the parties can identify 
shared goals, mechanisms for determining progress toward those 
goals, and options in the event the defendant fails to achieve the 
agreed goals.  It is not hard to imagine a court asked to specifically 
enforce HR terms in supply chain agreements taking analogous steps.  
It may not actually enforce the terms as written, but instead use them 
as a basis for crafting performative remedies that are realistic.  The 
judicial experience in IRL may provide a template for judges in cases 
involving specific performance of HR terms. 
                                               
 106. Settlement Agreement and Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution at ¶¶ 
3–12, 119–25, United States v. City of Seattle, No. 12-CV-1282 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 
2012).  The DOJ’s Principles for Promoting Police Integrity—which is a starting point for 
remedial design in many cases—demand continuous review of various data to 
determine “whether any revisions to training or practices are necessary.”  U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING POLICE INTEGRITY 5 (2001). 
 107. See SAN JOAQUIN RIVER RESTORATION PROGRAM, FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PLAN:  A 
FRAMEWORK FOR ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE SAN JOAQUIN RIVER RESTORATION 
PROGRAM:  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2010), https://www.usbr.gov/mp/nepa/includes 
/documentShow.php?Doc_ID=7569.  “Adaptive management is an approach allowing 
decision makers to take advantage of a variety of strategies and techniques that are adjusted, 
refined, and/or modified based on an improved understanding of system dynamics.”  Id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 110. Id. 
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Indeed, future iterations of the Model Contract Clauses might 
include terms which designate a particular monitor in advance of 
breach, or who will inspect upon a claim of breach.  It may specify steps 
the parties agree to take in order to remediate the breach, such as 
improved training or certification by front-line or other relevant 
personnel.  It may provide feedback mechanisms under which parties 
can then assess the efficacy (or not) of the steps thus taken.111 
B.   Relationalism 
A central feature of any consent decree must be “consent”—that is, 
both parties must agree to the resolution embodied in the decree.  It 
is easy to assume that if a seller breached HR terms in a supply chain 
agreement, it may have little interest in becoming party to a consent 
decree.  This is certainly possible, and in that event, the buyer is left to 
whatever litigation options it has.  If the seller believes that the buyer 
can make no progress in obtaining any remedy for breach, it is unlikely 
to come to the table, at which point rescission probably will be the 
buyer’s best (and perhaps most realistic) remedy. 
But this also assumes that the seller is willing to sacrifice its 
relationship with the buyer, and perhaps other similarly situated 
buyers.  This assumption may apply only to the most strategic and 
cynical sellers, in which case there are no options other than litigating 
and walking away.  But supply chain agreements are usually relational 
contracts, meaning agreements that are deliberately open-ended and 
flexible, intended not to be one-off affairs but the basis for sharing risks 
and rewards over a sustained period.112 
                                               
 111. Such terms may be similar to those identified by Bernstein in her recent study 
of Midwestern Original Equipment Manufacturers.  See Lisa Bernstein, Beyond 
Relational Contracts:  Social Capital and Network Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 563 (2015). 
 112. The literature on relational contracting is too large to cite here usefully.  Works 
relevant to this paper include:  id. at 566 (quoting Master Supply Agreement, HARLEY 
DAVIDSON (Nov. 2004), https://www.h-dsn.com/genbus/PublicDocServlet?docID= 
22&docExt (“Th[is] [supply agreement] . . . describes in general terms how we work 
together with our suppliers . . . .  [It] is not a long-term commitment; rather it is a 
commitment about how we will operate in the long-term.”); Amy H. Kastely, The Right 
to Require Performance in International Sales:  Towards an International Interpretation of the 
Vienna Convention, 63 WASH. L. REV. 607, 615 n.45 (1988) (citing Richard M. 
Brown, Specific Performance in a Planned Economy, in PAPERS AND COMMENTS DELIVERED 
AT THE EIGHT ANNUAL WORKSHOP ON COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 35, 37 (Jacob S. 
Ziegel ed., 1980) (observing that multinational supply agreements may be relational 
2019] SPECIFIC RELIEF AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1779 
 
Specific relief plays a special role in thinking about relational 
contracts.  Its directness and simplicity are generally thought to 
promote the formation and management of more fruitful 
relationships than money damages.  While negotiation over specific 
relief terms may be more costly than no negotiation at all—meaning, 
the default remedy of damages—the burden of negotiating these 
terms may be offset by the benefits of clarity.113  Considering the 
possibility that HR terms will be specifically enforced is likely to lead 
parties to take such terms more seriously than if they thought the only 
remedy available would be rescission or money damages.  Given the 
uncertainty of the dollar amounts at issue, that remedy may be none at 
all, in which event the HR term would be wasted.  Specific relief terms 
may thus increase efficiency as they force parties to negotiate more 
thoroughly and carefully with one another.114 
Moreover, specific relief terms may compel parties to resolve their 
differences more quickly than would recourse to default or liquidated 
damages.  The breaching promisor threatened with a judicial decree 
compelling performance is in many cases likely to take that sanction 
more seriously than an award of money damages, because damages can 
be difficult to determine or to collect.115  While enforcing specific relief 
will also not be easy, there is a view that in a broad range of cases, 
specific relief terms will induce more efficient and effective post-
breach adjustment than damages, even without the adaptations 
suggested by IRL-type consent decrees.116 
                                               
contracts)); see also JOSH WHITFORD, NEW OLD ECONOMY:  NETWORKS, INSTITUTIONS, AND 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURING (2005). 
 113. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle:  Toward a 
General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 1003–04 (1983) (“[A] 
carefully conditioned right of specific performance not only restrains evasion but also 
selectively filters the potentially opportunistic cases where the obligor’s cost of 
performance is substantially greater than the market value of performance.”). 
 114. See Schwartz, supra note 62, at 291 (arguing that specific relief terms “would minimize 
the inefficiencies of under compensation, reduce the need for liquidated damage clauses, 
minimize strategic behavior, and save the costs of litigating complex damage issues”). 
 115. Id. at 291–92. 
 116. See Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance:  Toward A Unified Theory 
of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 343–44 (1984) (“[U]nder specific 
performance post-breach adjustments to all contracts will be resolved in a manner 
most likely to lead to the promise being concluded in favor of the party who puts the 
highest value on the completed performance and at a lower cost than under any 
alternative.”); see also Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33, 35 (8th Cir. 1975) 
(determining the merits of Laclede’s argument that it is entitled to injunctive relief 
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All of this seems especially true in cases involving HR terms in supply 
chain agreements among multinational corporations.  While some 
non-U.S. companies may want or need to shirk contractual promises 
to honor HR terms, one can imagine that including specific relief for 
breach of such terms might empower other, more willing promisors to 
seek to change conditions at home such that they could perform or 
develop a second-best remedy to preserve a value-creating relationship.  
Having agreed to specific relief would not only alter the promisor’s 
relationship with the promisee, but also, potentially, others whose 
norms may conflict with the HR term in the SCA. 
Crafting more intentionally experimental and incremental terms, 
along the lines found in institutional reform litigations, may reinforce 
the relational power of specific relief terms.  A promisor who has 
agreed to the presence of a pre-breach monitor will know that the 
promisee has a window into the promisor’s operations that makes 
defection difficult and probably enhances the integrity of the 
relationship.  The promisor that has agreed, ex ante, to a monitor (pre- 
or post-breach) should find it difficult to object to a request to 
specifically enforce such a provision; a court may view such a 
mechanism as an incremental step designed to save the parties’ 
relationship, and on that ground grant the request. 
CONCLUSION 
Constructing contract terms to prevent or ameliorate serious social 
problems, such as the use of forced labor, is an innovative and 
important development in the use of contract.  It will present 
challenges for contract doctrine and theory.  This brief Article has only 
scratched the surface of one facet of the problems presented by such 
terms, specific relief for their breach. 
If nothing else, contract terms to remedy HR abuses are, themselves, 
unique, and their breach may well be irreparable in money damages.  
I have argued that parties that take such terms seriously should 
recognize that they may be doctrinally constrained.  Such constraints 
should not, however, lead the parties to abandon the terms or specific 
relief for their breach.  Instead, parties and courts should recognize 
the more limited, but still tangible, benefits that such terms can 
provide in this context. 
 
                                               
rather than damages); E. Air Lines v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 442–43 (S.D. 
Fla. 1975) (concluding that specific performance is not an extraordinary remedy). 
